Attacking Soviet infantry forces were not only accompanied by tanks but closely followed by medium and heavy guns to provide the direct fire that could systematically destroy buildings used as strongpoints.

In the bigger cities where buildings were more substantial, a doctrine of direct artillery fire was emphasized. In the later battles for the smaller cities and towns of East Prussia this approach would turn the wood-and-brick buildings into a pile of rubble that buried the defenders: resistance often only lasted a few hours. When assault could not be avoided, Soviet forces applied their planning norms for extraordinarily heavy “annihilation” ( unichtozhenie) levels of artillery bombardment. As the Soviets pushed west, Stalin’s Stavka, the Soviet high command, directed bypassing defended urban areas and even leaving escape routes open to avoid a close urban fight that reduced Soviet advantages in mass and firepower. Yet, by 1944 all the armies had also learned to minimize building-to-building and room-to-room fighting and exploit firepower. Wehrmacht soldiers would tie their stick grenades in bundles to breach walls and use poles to get them behind interior cover or to reach defenders in upper rooms or stairwells. Vasily Chuikov emphasized that in urban warfare, “you’ve got to pluck the enemy out with bayonets and grenades,” and directed troops to carry ten to twelve grenades and throw one first at every corner and doorway. The building-clearing drill in Commonwealth armies was focused on supporting the “bomber” who, directed by the section commander, constantly tossed or dropped grenades ahead of the “entrymen.” Soviet Gen. Attackers had learned that they would lose a close-quarters marksmanship contest with lurking defenders unless every room and space was first blasted before entry to kill, or at least daze and deafen, anyone within. The essential tool for clearing was the grenade. While tactics differed between armies, some attack methods were constant. Ironically, there were weapons systems available in 1944 that were better suited to the problems of urban combat than those we have today.īy 1944 both Allied and Axis armies had paid in blood to discover what was needed to progress against a determined enemy who took advantage of the cover and concealment offered by buildings and presented a threat of constant ambush from three dimensions. Last year John Spencer offered a wish list of tools the US Army does not have but that he would want if sent to fight in a dense urban environment, as he did in Baghdad in 2007–2008. In some respects, though, we are actually much less prepared now than in the past.

A key message of this site is that contemporary armies are unprepared for the challenges of operating in cities.

Battlefield 1943 dday